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In this paper, we study the dynamics of initial public offerings (IPOs) by examining the
tradeoff between an entrepreneur’s private benefits, which are lost whenever the firm is
publicly traded, versus the advantages from diversification.  We characterize the timing
dimension of the decision to go public, derive a function for firm value, and describe their
effect on the evolution of firm risk over time.  Our model, which endogenizes the timing of the
decision to stay private or to go public, is able explain two puzzling phenomena: the clustering
of IPOs and buyouts in time and the long-run underperformance of recently issued stock
relative to the shares of longer-listed companies.
We are grateful to Yakov Amihud, Michael Brennan, Oscar Couwenberg, Chris Mann, Jacob
Lester, Casper Oosterhof, Lee Nelson, and to seminar participants at Goethe University, New
York University, Tel-Aviv University, University of Groningen, Hebrew University, and the
Portugese Finance Network for their comments and suggestions.
1,,QWURGXFWLRQ
Several reasons have been proposed for why entrepreneurs sell shares of their firms to
the public.  Trivially, companies may issue stock to finance future investments.  Yet, this
in itself does not justify initial public offerings (IPOs) as bank loans or private equity
placements may equally well finance a need for funds.  Moreover, Pagano, Panetta, and
Zingales [1998] find that investments of firms actually GHFOLQH after an IPO.  Holmström
and Tirole [1993] and Bolton and Von Thadden [1998] suggest that by selling stock on
the public market, companies subject themselves to monitoring by outsiders (e.g.,
investment banks, auditors, analysts, investors); activities that may enhance the value of
the firm. They also suggest, like Amihud and Mendelson [1988], that IPOs make the
firms’ shares more liquid, which raises firm value even more.  Benveniste and Spindt
[1989], Dow and Gorton [1997], Habib and Ljungqvist [1998], Subrahmanyam and
Titman [1999], and Maug [2000] argue that IPOs allow entrepreneurs to use the share
price to infer investors’ valuations of their firm; this information can be used in post-IPO
investment decisions and for management’s incentive compensation.  Along similar
lines, Chemmanur and Fulghieri [1999] argue that both public and private ownership
entail information advantages and that the optimal decision on this structure minimizes
the related costs.
All the suggested reasons for going public exhibit some tradeoff between the
benefits of being publicly traded and its associated costs.  Consequently, as the
conditions under which the firm operates change, the incentives to be public or private
may also change.  Yet, most of the papers above model the decision to go public as a
single shot: entrepreneurs have but one chance to decide whether to go public or to stay
private.  Clearly, this way of modeling ignores the ability of entrepreneurs to WLPH their
IPO, since the decision to remain private WRGD\ does not eliminate the possibility of
going public at some future date.  Furthermore, such an analysis also ignores any
opportunities to take the firm private again, either directly (e.g., in a management buyout
2(MBO) or a leveraged buyout (LBO)) or indirectly (i.e., by being purchased by another
company).
This paper complements the current literature on the decision to go public by
explicitly considering the timing dimension of IPOs as well as the timing of going-
private transactions.  Specifically, we analyze the optimal conditions to take a company
public and the circumstances to reverse this decision (to become a private firm again).  In
our model, the investments of the firm have been made.  The owner takes the company
public because outside investors, being more diversified, are willing to pay a higher price
for the risky cash flows of the firm than the entrepreneur’s own valuation of these flows.1
Going public, however, means that the owner gives up her “private benefits of control”
(for example, because of more intense monitoring of a public firm as in Bolton and Von
Thadden [1998]).2  If entrepreneurs have but one chance to go public, they would simply
trade off the benefits and costs of an IPO and choose their best course of action
accordingly.  In our model, however, the decision to remain private in any given period
may be reversed at later dates (and vice versa).  Therefore, the decision to go public
entails more than a straightforward comparison of LPPHGLDWH costs and benefits.  In this
paper we analyze the optimal timing of an IPO explicitly considering the dynamics of a
firm’s cash flows while also allowing for reversibility of today’s decisions in future
periods.3
                                                
1
 The higher price outside investors are willing to pay for the firm’s cash flows can also be viewed
as capturing the added value of monitoring public companies or as the value which is contributed
by the increased post-IPO liquidity to the “private” cash flow value of the shares.
2
 The “private benefits” can also be regarded as the agency costs saved by a firm that is not traded
publicly.  These costs (as considered in detail by Jensen [1986]) include any costs of separating
ownership from control, but may also refer to administrative costs (e.g., filing requirements,
audited financial statements, etc.), the costs of information gathered by outside investors, and
increased disclosure of inside information that may reduce the competitive advantages of the firm.
3
 The dynamics of similar flexibilities have been studied by Ikenberry and Vermaelen [1996] and
Fluck [1999].
3Some empirical regularities suggest that entrepreneurs indeed time their
decisions to go public.  For example, there are waves in IPOs, a phenomenon called “hot
issue markets” (Ritter [1984]).  Moreover, these waves are often disproportionally
populated with firms in a particular industry.  One possible reason for the “hot” markets
in IPOs is that firms, especially in certain industries, face better investment opportunities
during some periods than in other times, so that IPOs merely allow for increased fund
raising.  However, Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist [1994] find that hot issue markets do
not coincide with an increase in subsequent investments.  Rather, IPOs appear to cluster
during periods in which investors place relatively high values on the cash flows of the
firms that go public; a result we derive in the context of our model.  Specifically, we
show that entrepreneurs issue shares when the “public” cash flow value of their firm is
relatively high.  Conversely, our model indicates that firms are taken private when the
market valuation of the expected cash flows is low (relative to the private benefits).  This
is consistent with evidence of Halpern, Kieschnick, and Rotenberg [1999].
A puzzling aspect of IPOs, which still remains unexplained, is that the returns on
recently issued stock over the five years following the IPO are substantially below the
market returns (see Ritter [1991], Loughran and Ritter [1995], Nelson [1999], and Baker
and Burglar [1999]).4  Our model can explain such “underperformance”: its source stems
from the possibility to re-privatize publicly traded companies.  In case the firm’s risky
cash flows have fallen sufficiently, so that the gains from diversification have been
diminished and there is no justification to incur the costs of being public (i.e., the
associated loss in private benefits), the firm will be taken private.  On average, the value
of the option to re-privatize represents a larger proportion of total firm value for a
company that has been listed recently than for a firm that has been traded for a longer
                                                
4
 The empirical significance of these findings has been the subject of recent debate (see Brav and
Gompers [1997] and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers [1999]).
4period of time.  Accordingly, the risk of recently issued “young” firms (for which this
“put option” is a relatively large fraction of firm value) is smaller than the risk of “older”
companies (with a relatively low “option” value).  Hence, the returns on recently issued
stock should be smaller than the returns on longer-listed shares.
Empirically, the option to re-privatize recently issued firms is not trivial.  To see
this, in Table I we present numbers (derived from Welch [1999]) that show the fraction
of firms dropped from the exchange, liquidated, merged, or acquired within five years
after their IPO.  The striking empirical regularity documented by Welch [1999] is that
almost half the firms that go public are de-listed, one way or another, within five years
after the IPO.  Admittedly, firms may be de-listed or absorbed into another firm not only
to save the costs of running a public company.  Yet, this large fraction of de-listings
suggests that the option to re-privatize is important in understanding the public-private
decision and its impact on firm value and firm risk.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II presents the
framework within which the entrepreneur’s decision to go public is analyzed.  In Section
III we derive the value function for the firm and characterize its properties.  Section IV
discusses the empirical implications of our model.  In Section V we present two
extensions of our framework.  Finally, Section VI offers some concluding remarks.
,,6HWXSRIWKHPRGHO
We consider a firm that is currently owned by an entrepreneur who may decide, DW WKH
VWDUWRIHDFKRIWKHFRPLQJSHULRGV, whether to take the firm public or to keep it private.
We assume that the decision to go public or to stay private is reversible: at any point in
time the firm may be taken public (if it is private) or can be privatized again (in case it is
public).  Thus, effectively at any date the firm faces the question whether it should be
private or public during the next period.
5We separate the investment decisions from the question of ownership, taking the
capital budgeting decisions of the firm as given by assuming that the firm has made all
its investments.  These investments generate a stream of uncertain cash flows to the
firm’s owners.  (In periods in which the firm is private, the technology also returns a
flow of “private benefits”, which are specified below).  We model the evolution of the
cash flows (which are taken to be net of any necessary investments) in a binomial
framework.  Specifically, if at time W the cash flow is &), then the cash flow at time W1
will be either X&) or G&), where X> 1 > G.  The states of nature attached to X or G are
called the “up state” and the “down state”, respectively.  We consider a model with an
infinite horizon in which X and G are time- and state-independent.
For every period in which the firm is private, the entrepreneur derives some
“private benefits of control”. 5  These private benefits, denoted by 3%,capture the private
value of control as well as any savings of monitoring, bonding, and agency costs a public
firm incurs due to the separation between ownership and control.  3% can be viewed
more generally as capturing any difference between the public and private value of a firm
(see footnote 2).  For now we assume that 3% is some positive constant (an assumption
we relax in Section V).  Hence, at each pair ^W,V‘ of time and state the total stream of
benefits from the firm is its cash flow &)0XVG WV if it is public (where &)0 is the initial
cash flow), and &)0XVGWV + 3% in case the firm is private.
Next we specify the valuation in our model.  We assume that the risk-free rate of
return is U!0 in all periods.  We assume that risk-free investments are equally available
to all agents so that the same risk-free rate U is used by both the entrepreneur as well as
outside investors to discount risk-free cash flows.  To value risky cash flows, we employ
                                                
5
 We do not require that it is the VDPH agent who owns the firm during every period in which it is
privately held.  However, to simplify the language, we refer to WKH entrepreneur throughout the
paper, as if she were one.
6the up state and another for the down state).  These prices depend on whether the firm is
private or public.  The difference between the private and the public pairs of state prices
captures the typical situation in which the entrepreneur is less diversified than the
investors who own the firm when it is publicly traded.
If the firm is private, its flows are valued by the entrepreneur at her SULYDWH state
prices, which we denote by S
X
 for the up state and S
G
 for the down state.  If the firm is
publicly traded, the SXEOLF state prices are given by T
X 
for the up state and T
G
 for the down
state.  Since both the entrepreneur and outside investors can invest in the risk-free asset,











To capture the incomplete diversification of the entrepreneur’s “portfolio”, which makes








.  To see
intuitively, why this VSUHDG between these prices captures the higher tolerance to the
firm’s risk of the well-diversified investor than that of the incompletely diversified
owner, note that in the up state the entrepreneur has “too much” consumption relative to
diversified investors.  Hence, the private state price, S
X
, is VPDOOHU than the public one,T
X
.
Similarly, because in the cash flow’s down state the entrepreneur has “too little”
consumption relative to a well-diversified investor, the private state price, S
G
, is JUHDWHU




  Thus, these state prices capture the idea that diversification
allows the entrepreneur to hedge against the down state by selling part of her
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 This intuition can be expressed formally by considering the state prices as the probability-
adjusted marginal rates of substitution of an investor.  If the utility function is concave, the
assumed spread in these state prices will result from the lack of diversification.
7Another intuitive way to interpret our assumption is based on the relative
valuations both pairs of state prices imply for the firm’s cash flows.  Since well-
diversified investors are “less averse” to the unique risk of the firm, we expect their
valuation of the uncertain cash flows to be higher than the value a non-diversified
entrepreneur attaches to the same stream.  The following lemma shows that, given our
assumptions, the public value of the firm’s cash flows is higher than their private value:








, the private value of the uncertain cash flow




where &(3ULYDWH and &(3XEOLF denote the private and public certainty equivalents,
respectively, of the uncertain cash flow over the next period expressed per unit of current
cash flow.





























G, which can be rewritten to the result
desired.     ||
Lastly, we assume that &(3XEOLF1, which guarantees that the value of the firm is always
finite.7
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This will be finite if and only if &(3XEOLF<1.
8,,,9DOXHRIWKHILUP
In this section we define the value function of the firm and derive its properties.  This
value function is an option-like function which takes into account that, at any future date,
the firm can either be taken public or bought out to become private again.
Consider some time W with an associated cash flow &).  If at the beginning of
this date the firm is private, the entrepreneur receives the firm’s cash flow, &), SOXV the
private benefits, 3%.  On the other hand, in case the firm is public at the beginning of
date W, its shareholders only get the cash flow &).
After receiving the cash flow and the private benefits (if the firm is currently
private at W), the entrepreneur can choose whether the firm will be public or private in the
QH[W period.  Since our model is stationary and has an infinite horizon, the value of the
firm is a time-independent function of the its cash flow, 9(&)).  Now consider the case
in which the firm has decided to stay private at time W.  Then the next period, the
entrepreneur’s payoff will be ( )X &) 3% 9 X&)⋅ + +  in the up state and
( )G &) 3% 9 G&)⋅ + +  in the down state.
The value of the firm to the entrepreneur in this case is:
(3)
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )





9 &) S X &) 3% 9 X&) S G &) 3% 9 G&)
3%
&( &) S 9 X&) S 9 G&)
5
= ∗ ⋅ + + + ∗ ⋅ + +
= ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅
Thus, the firm value is the sum of the value of the immediate cash flows, the immediate
private benefits, and the future value of the firm all discounted at the private state prices.
Analogously, the value of the firm in case the entrepreneur chooses to go public at date W
is:
(4)
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )





9 &) T X &) 9 X&) T G &) 9 G&)
&( &) T 9 X&) T 9 G&)
= ∗ ⋅ + + ∗ ⋅ +
= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
9The decision at time W to be public or private during the next period given the firm’s
current cash flow &) depends on whether 93XEOLF(&)) ><  93ULYDWH(&)).  This gives the
following (recursive) value function:8
(5)
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )








9 &) 0D[ 9 &) 9 &)
&( &) T 9 X&) T 9 G&)
0D[ 3%
&( &) S 9 X&) S 9 G&)
5
=
 ⋅ + + 
=  
⋅ + + +  
Note that the definition of the value function 9 implicitly assumes that upon re-
privatization the entrepreneur will have to pay the full private value of the firm (i.e.,
including a premium above its public value).  This is motivated by free-riding and holdup
problems (e.g., see Grossman and Hart [1980]).  Allowing for some other, say
negotiation-driven, split of the difference between these private and public values of the
firm will not change our results.
We divide our discussion of the properties of the value function into two parts.
The next proposition derives some relatively obvious, asymptotic properties of the
function so its proof is suppressed.  The second proposition derives some deeper
properties of the value function.
3URSRVLWLRQ  The following are the asymptotic properties of the value function 9(&)):
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 are all less than one, the value function equations
define a contraction, which means that a unique value function exists.
10

















• The Lemma implies that the slope of the “always public” function is greater than








• For cash flows sufficiently large (or private benefits sufficiently small), the firm




















The next proposition gives the monotonicity and convexity properties of the value
function.
3URSRVLWLRQ  The value function 9(&)) is continuous, increasing, and convex in &).
11
3URRI  Define the continuous, increasing, and convex function :(&)WQ) for a fixed
horizon Q by the following recursive relation:





















0D[ &( &) &( &) W Q
5
3%
&( &) S : X&) W Q: &) W Q 5
S : G&) W Q0D[ W Q
&( &) T : X&) W Q
T : G&) W Q
≥  
⋅ + ⋅ = −     
⋅ + + +
=      + + < −   
⋅ + +    + + 
9 is the limit of :(´,´,Q) as Q grows to infinity and inherits the properties of :.  This
means that continuity and the positive slope of 9 are immediate.  It also means that as













To prove convexity of 9(&)) we proceed by induction.  The function :(&)Q
1Q) is convex since it is the maximum of two linear functions and such a maximum is
always convex.  Now suppose that :(&)QNQ) is convex.  Then :(&)QN1Q) is
convex as it is the maximum of two convex functions.  This proves that :(&)WQ) is
convex for any fixed horizon Q.  Since, keeping W fixed, ( ) ( )lim , ,
Q
9 &) : &) W Q
→∞
= , this











Propositions 1 and 2 show that the value function looks like the graph shown in Figure 1.
Note that the function looks like the value of a “call option” on the public value of the
firm’s cash flows shifted upwards by 3%U, the present value of all future private
benefits.  Alternatively, the value function can be viewed as the sum of:
 • The value of the risky cash flows as if the company will always be public, and;
 • The value of a “put option” allowing entrepreneurs to reclaim (the present value of)
the flow of private benefits (in addition to the firm’s stream of uncertain cash
flows).
The functional form of the value function suggests that at low cash flow levels the firm is
private while at higher levels it is public.  This is indeed the case as the next two
propositions, which begin our characterization of the optimal timing of IPOs, show.
3URSRVLWLRQ  Suppose that, at time W with current cash flow &), it is optimal to keep









(We call this “9 is private at &)”).  Then 9 is also private for any cash flow ;<&).

















 > 0 and rewriting (8), we get that 9(&)) is private if:
(9) ( ) [ ]
5
3%
G&)9X&)9’&)&(&( 3ULYDWH3XEOLF <−⋅+⋅− )()(
Intuitively, 9(&)) is private if the gains from diversification, both on the immediate cash
flows of the current date and on the expected value at the end of the next period, are
smaller than the loss of this period’s private benefits.  To prove that 9(;) is private for
all ; < &), we have to show that the condition holds for all ;&):
(10) ( ) [ ]
5
3%
G;9X;9’;&(&( 3ULYDWH3XEOLF <−⋅+⋅− )()(
This is true since &(3XEOLF > &(3ULYDWH, which implies that:
(11) ( ) ( ) &)&(&(;&(&( 3ULYDWH3XEOLF3ULYDWH3XEOLF ⋅−<⋅−
and as ’ > 0, ;< &), and 9(&)) is convex in &), which means that:
(12) [ ] [ ])()()()( G&)9X&)9’G;9X;9’ −⋅<−⋅      ||
3URSRVLWLRQSimilarly, suppose that, at time W with current cash flow &), it is optimal




(We call this “V is public at &)”).  Then 9(<) is also public at any < > &).9
                                                
9
 The proof of Proposition 4 is similar to that of Proposition 3 above.
14
Propositions 3 and 4 imply that there is some critical cash flow level, &), such that for
all cash flows greater than or equal to &) the firm is public and for all cash flows below
&) the firm is private.  &) is that cash flow at which the firm’s value as a public
company for the next period just equals the value of the firm as a privately held entity.
The firm goes public when its cash flow rises above &) and it is re-privatized when the









Based on the “monotonicity property” derived from Propositions 3 and 4 and on the
stationarity of all the parameters in the model it is trivial to prove the following
“triangular” properties:
                                                
10
 So far we have ignored any switching costs of going public or private.  We consider such costs
in Section V.
15
3URSRVLWLRQ  If 9 is public (private) at X&) and at G&), then 9 is also public (private)
at &).
3URSRVLWLRQ  If 9 is public (private) today at &), then 9 is public (private) in at least
one state of the world tomorrow.
Private Public






t t+1 t t+1
t t+1 t t+1
)LJXUH
These key properties of our value function and of the optimal timing of IPOs can be
derived without specifying the probabilities of the up and down state (i.e., without any
specification of the expected return of the firm’s activities).  Next, we characterize the
evolution of the risk of the firm over time and provide a sufficient condition for the value
of the firm to rise, on average, over time (i.e., for the expected return to be positive in
terms of capital gains).
16








≡ , where V0 ^X,G‘.  Then the variance of this return,
9DU(U
V
), is increasing in the firm’s cash flow.












































<  for all <!;
(i.e., the function 9;/; declines monotonically in ;).  This condition follows from












≤      ||
Proposition 7 means that if the firm’s cash flow grows over time, the variance of its rate
of return will increase as well.  This is an outcome of the convexity of the value function,
which reflects the option to re-privatize publicly traded firms.  Note that the impact of
this convexity of 9&) on the variance of the return is more pronounced at lower levels
of the current cash flow since this “put option” has little impact on firm value at high
cash flow levels.
17
3URSRVLWLRQ  If pi⋅X1–pi⋅G>1, the expected value of the firm at the end of the
next period will be higher than its current value: pi⋅9(X&))(1–pi)⋅9(G&))>9(&)) (i.e.,
the expected rate of return in terms of capital gains, ((U
V
), is positive).
3URRI  Let pi be such that pi⋅X(1–pi)⋅G= 1.  Then, by the convexity of 9(&)):
(18) )()()1()( ** &)9G&)9X&)9 ≥⋅−+⋅ pipi
with a strict inequality if 9(&)) is strictly convex.  As X> G, pi⋅X(1–pi)⋅G> 1 for all
pi> pi.  Since 9(&)) is monotone, for all pi!pi it holds that:
(19) )()()1()()()1()( ** &)9G&)9X&)9G&)9X&)9 ≥⋅−+⋅>⋅−+⋅ pipipipi .     ||
The intuition underlying Proposition 8 is based on the fact that (in case the expected cash
flow is non-decreasing over time) the dispersion of the cash flows the firm can possibly
generate strictly increases over time.  Since the shareholders have the option to re-
privatize the firm, which makes firm value a convex function of the cash flows, this
increase in the cash flow dispersion causes the expected value of the firm to rise over
time.  This means that the expected rate of return on the firm’s activities (in terms of
capital gains) is positive even if the cash flows are expected to remain constant over time
and, even more so, in case the current cash flow is expected to grow.
,9(PSLULFDO,PSOLFDWLRQV
In the preceding sections we characterized the timing of the decision to go public (to re-
privatize) based on the tradeoff between private benefits of control and better
diversification of the firm’s risk.  We showed that the optimal timing of an IPO occurs
when the firm’s cash flow rises above a certain critical level, which we denoted by &).
At this cash flow level, the value of the firm as a privately held entity is equal to its value
as a publicly traded company.  The reverse is true for the decision to take the company
private again: it is optimal to buy out the firm (e.g., by an MBO, an LBO, an acquisition
18
by private parties, etc.) when its cash flow falls below &).  Because the company can be
re-privatized, firm value is a convex function of its cash flows.  Intuitively, the value
function looks like the present value that well-diversified investors attach to the cash
flows the firm is expected to generate plus the value of a “put option” allowing
entrepreneurs to reclaim (the present value of) the private benefits.  The characterization
of the optimal timing of IPOs and the resulting value function have several empirical
implications, which we discuss in this section.
First, consider the phenomenon of “hot issue markets”: the observation that
many firms go public at about the same time, typically when the values of already-traded
firms are high.  Our results are consistent with this phenomenon and explain it via the
cross-sectional correlation in the profitability of firms.  Since changes in macro-
economic conditions (e.g., due to cyclicality) simultaneously affect multiple industries
and companies, firm profitability tends to be positively correlated.  In particular, good
economic circumstances positively impact the cash flows of many firms.  Our model
predicts that firms go public when their cash flows are high, which means that when one
firm finds it optimal to issue stock so do other firms.  Therefore, our model predicts that
IPOs will come in waves.  Furthermore, since the correlation between the cash flows of
firms within the same industry is likely to be greater than the cross-sectional correlation
at large, our results are consistent with the industry concentration that characterizes
waves in IPOs.  Finally, good economic conditions impact the cash flows of both
publicly traded and privately held firms.  Hence, the waves in IPOs, which happen when
the cash flows of the issuing firms are high, occur when the cash flows of publicly traded
firms are high as well.  Thus, IPO waves coincide with times of relatively high share
prices in general (i.e., a boom on the stock market).
The discussion above shows that the model predicts some of the stylized facts
regarding IPOs well-documented in the literature.  Based on our model, we can also
derive implications for the patterns we expect to observe in the reverse, mirror
19
transaction: the re-privatization of firms.  Specifically, our model predicts that going-
private transactions (by an MBO, LBO, or otherwise) will occur in waves as well and
that these waves will coincide with times of relatively low stock prices.  The model also
predicts that these waves in buyouts will be concentrated in specific industries for which
cash flows are especially low.
There are several papers supporting our conclusions on the clustering of going-
private transactions.  Kaplan and Stein [1993], for example, document the “hot
privatization market” of the 1980s.  Lehn and Poulsen [1989] as well as Opler and
Titman [1993] have studied about the same time frame and conclude that the buyouts
they examined were mainly caused by the great amount of financial slack and large free
cash flows within the firms which were privatized.  This is perfectly consistent with our
story that when the private benefits, such as the agency costs associated with free cash
flows (see Jensen [1986]), are large relative to the firm’s cash flow, the company will be
privatized again to reclaim these opportunity costs.  Kaplan [1991] has studied such
firms in the period after their LBO and discovered that most of these re-privatizations
were not permanent, but went public again after some form of reorganization (the firms
were private for a median period of 6,8 years).  This finding is also consistent with the
tradeoff underlying our main story.  If the private benefits (in the form of agency costs
associated to free cash flows) are large, the company goes private.  While it is private,
the firm will be reorganized to recapture this free cash flow and internalize it into the
“regular” cash flow of the firm, &).  When this is done and the private benefits (agency
costs) have diminished, the advantages from diversification are too large to justify
staying private any longer, and the firm goes public again.  In this respect, the model is
able to describe the sequence of transactions as documented in the literature.
There is another way in which our model is able to explain the clustering of IPOs
over time in “hot issue markets”.  This explanation is related to learning by outside
investors and takes a somewhat different angle for interpreting the nature of the private
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benefits.  These benefits can also be regarded to represent any costs of information
gathered by outsiders to learn more about the activities of the company.  Now, consider a
particular industry with a number of firms which are still privately held.  These firms
probably all face the same level of private benefits as viewed to be the costs of gathering
information.  The companies can be ordered according to the level of their current cash
flow, and now, lets suppose that the firm with the highest cash flow within the industry
finds it worthwhile to go public.  During and after this IPO outside investors learn more
about the company and its activities.  But, they also learn about the whole industry and
implicitly this learning by outsiders affects the level of private benefits of the remaining
(private) firms (i.e., it lowers the costs of gathering information about their activities).
Due to this externality, the firm with the next highest cash flow now may also find it
worthwhile to go public, since its private benefits have diminished while the advantages
from diversification are the still the same and appealing.  This way an iterative process
starts which stops until of all private firms within the industry the company with the next
highest cash flow will want to remain private based on its own tradeoff between being
private and becoming public.  A direct consequence of our reasoning here is that in case
outsiders are able to learn very quickly about a new industry and its activities, that there
will be a waves in IPOs of firms active in that business.  In such a way, the externality of
learning in general affects not only the company that goes public, but also other private
firms within the same industry or related sectors of the economy.
One of the more puzzling observations regarding IPOs is the
“underperformance” of recently issued shares relative to the return of the market over
several years following the initial offering.11  The benchmark for the market return has
been measured by the return of several indices; common to all of them is that they are
                                                
11
 Recall from our introduction that several papers have questioned the statistical support for this
finding.
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largely comprised of relatively “old” firms which have been publicly traded for a long
time.  Thus, the underperformance of recently offered stock is measured relative to the
performance of longer-listed shares.
The results of our model suggest a possible explanation for such
underperformance.  This explanation is based on our characterization of the value of the
firm as the sum of two values: the “public” value of the risky cash flows and the value of
the option to re-privatize the firm for its stream of private benefits.  The decomposition
of firm value into this cash flow value and that of the “put option” implies a similar
breakdown of firm risk.  Specifically, the risk of the company is the weighted average of
the risk of the cash flows and of the risk of the option to re-privatize.  The weights of
these two risk components are equal to the fractions of their values relative to total firm
value.  Typically, cash flows have more systematic (i.e., priced) risk than put options
(which may even exhibit QHJDWLYH risk as their value usually moves in the opposite
direction to the economy at large).  Moreover, the option to re-privatize has a
proportionally higher value for firms with borderline cash flows (i.e., close to &)) than
for companies with high levels of cash flow.  Thus, the “put option” represents a larger
proportion of firm value for recently listed shares than for longer-traded stock, since the
cash flows of these “young” firms, by definition, are close to &),  while the “older”
(public) companies have higher cash flows.  Hence, it follows that the average risk of
recently issued shares is lower than that of longer-listed stock.
Looking at this point from a different angle, consider the cross section of “old”
firms, which have been traded for quite some time.  The average cash flow of these
companies will be considerably higher than the critical cash flow &).  Therefore, given
the results of our model, the risk of those longer-listed stocks is greater than the risk of
recently offered firms, which have cash flows close to &).  Consequently, the returns
the shareholders of these “older” companies demand will have to be higher and thus
justifiably “outperform” the rates of return on recently issued shares.
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97ZRH[WHQVLRQVRIWKHPRGHO
In this section we consider two extensions of our model: allowing for switching costs
between being private and being public, and for private benefits to increase in the firm’s
cash flow.  We show that these extensions do not invalidate our main results about the
optimal timing of IPOs and the resulting properties of firm value and firm risk.
([WHQVLRQ6ZLWFKLQJFRVWV
In our basic model, we do not explicitly consider any costs of switching from
being private to being public or vice versa.  Here, we show how such costs, which may
include IPO discounts due to underpricing and premiums paid in going-private
transactions, can be incorporated into the model without affecting our main intuition and
results.  The only difference between the models with and without switching costs is that
in case there are such costs we have two value functions: one for the value of the firm if
it is private and the other for its value when the company is public.
To see this, we consider a finite horizon of Q and switching costs equal to ;.
Suppose we are one period before the horizon (i.e., W Q1).  Furthermore, suppose that
the firm is currently private and its cash flow is equal to &).  Then the firm’s value is:








where the “state of being private” is denoted by “0” (we will denote the “state of being
public” by “1”).  Note that the value function for the private firm incorporates a cost ; of
switching from private to public.  Similarly if the firm is public at W Q1:


































































Continuing this recursively, we can derive:
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Taking the limit of these finite-horizon functions such that Q→∞, we get the value
functions for an infinite horizon:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),0 lim , , ,0 , ,1 lim , , ,1
Q Q
9 &) : &) W Q 9 &) : &) W Q
→∞ →∞
= = .
Now, we can establish the following properties of the functions 9(&),K) for K 0 and 1
separately, in the same way as we did for the case without any switching costs.
3URSRVLWLRQ 9(&)K),for K 0 and 1, has the following properties:
• Both value functions are increasing in &).
• Both value functions are convex.
• Both value functions exhibit the “triangular” properties.
It is important to remember, however, that now there are WZR distinct value functions for
the firm.  In the graph below we plot the difference between 9(&)0) –9(&)1) for a





















At very low cash flows (&)< 0.95 in the graph), the firm will stay private if it is already
private or will become private if it is currently public.  Therefore, the difference between
the two value functions is equal to the switching cost ;.  Similarly if the cash flows are
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high (&)> 1.94 in the graph), the firm will remain public if it is already public or
become public if it happens to be private.  Therefore, the difference between the value
functions for high cash flows is –;.  For intermediate cash flows (between 0.95 and
1.94), the costs ; are greater than the potential gain from any switch.  Thus, for this
range of cash flows, the firm will remain private (public) for one more period if it is
currently private (public).  The difference between the two functions moves from ; to –;
as the probability of a switch from being private to being public increases.
([WHQVLRQ/LQHDUSULYDWHEHQHILWV
In the basic model we assumed that the private benefits are fixed at some
constant level 3%.  In this part we replace that assumption and take the private benefits to
be increasing linearly in the cash flows of the firm: 3% = D + E⋅&).  This means that if
the firm is currently private, the entrepreneur’s payoff in the up state becomes:
(25) ( ) ( )X&)9DX&)EX&)9&)XED&)X +++=+⋅⋅++⋅ 1)()(
and in the down state her payoff becomes:
(26) ( ) ( )G&)9DG&)EG&)9&)GED&)G +++=+⋅⋅++⋅ 1)()( .
Thus the value function 93ULYDWH(&)), as it was given in equation (3), changes to:
(27) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )3ULYDWH 3ULYDWH
X G
D
9 &) E &( &) S 9 X&) S 9 G&)
5
= + ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅
while 93XEOLF(&)) remains as defined in Section III.  Thus, by simply redefining the cash
flow &) in case the firm is private to include a multiplication by (1E) we can keep all
of our analysis intact.  For our problem to remain interesting, however, we need to ensure
that the newly defined private benefits do not dominate the diversification gains of going
public.  Assuming that the parameter D is positive, this means that the slope of the value
function in case the firm is always private has to be smaller than the slope of the function





































This inequality has to hold since otherwise entrepreneurs will never take their firms
public.  In addition, we can derive a sufficient condition for our “triangular” properties to
hold, which is:
(30) 3XEOLF3ULYDWH &(E&( <+⋅ )1(
Since &(3XEOLF < 1, this condition is stricter than the inequality given in equation (29).
Thus, by assuming parameter E is small enough for the condition in equation (30) to
hold, we can keep our model’s results intact, including the characterization of the
optimal timing of IPOs and buyouts, and the resulting properties for firm value and risk.
9,&RQFOXVLRQV
This paper studies the timing dimension of the decision to go public.  The current
literature on IPOs has considered this decision as a single shot: entrepreneurs have but
one chance to take their firm public.  We complement this literature by examining the
ability of entrepreneurs to WLPH their IPO and also investigate the possibility to UH
SULYDWL]H publicly traded firms.
In our model, the entrepreneur trades off the gains of diversification against the
benefits of being private.  During times in which cash flows are sufficiently high, the
potential advantages from diversification outweigh these private benefits and the firm
goes public.  As entrepreneurs can choose to take their firm public at any date and
reverse this choice later on, the decision to go public reflects more than the LPPHGLDWH
costs and benefits.
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We characterize the optimal timing of IPOs and derive implications for firm
value and firm risk.  Our results are consistent with several empirical regularities:
• The documented clustering of IPOs over time in “hot issue markets”, which
are often disproportionally populated with firms in a particular industry.
Moreover, we derive mirror implications regarding the timing of going-
private transactions.
• The stylized fact that waves in IPOs coincide with times of relatively high
stock prices.  Again, the mirror prediction of our model regarding waves in
buyouts is that these transactions coincide with periods of relatively low
stock prices.
• The puzzling below-market returns recently issued shares have earned, over
several years following the IPO, relative to the stock returns of companies
that have been listed a long time ago.
We also show that the model’s results and its properties for firm value and firm risk
given our characterization of the timing of IPOs are robust to two extensions of the basic
model.  The first extension allows for switching costs: transaction costs of going public
or costs attached to buyouts.  The second extension allows for private benefits increasing
in the firm’s cash flow.
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The table below shows the number of firms that initially sold their shares to the public by
year and the number and fraction of the IPOs that were dropped from the exchange,
liquidated (“deleted”), or merged / acquired (“M&A”) within five years after the IPO.














1980 30 2 7% 15 50% 17 57%
1981 21 6 29% 9 43% 15 71%
1982 17 8 47% 4 24% 12 71%
1983 60 8 13% 18 30% 26 43%
1984 64 9 14% 25 39% 34 53%
1985 109 24 22% 41 38% 65 60%
1986 327 68 21% 114 35% 182 56%
1987 412 74 18% 120 29% 194 47%
1988 242 33 14% 60 25% 93 38%
1989 197 22 11% 44 22% 66 34%
1990 209 22 11% 44 21% 66 32%
1991 394 30 8% 108 27% 138 35%
1992 684 76 11% 143 21% 219 32%
1993 1034 106 10% 176 17% 282 27%
1994 839 79 9% 102 12% 181 22%
$YHUDJH   
